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Abstract	and	Keywords
This	chapter	sketches	a	history	of	European	colonial	states	in	Africa,	north	and	south	of	the	Sahara,	during	the	nineteenth
and	twentieth	centuries.	It	explains	when	and	why	colonial	states	emerged,	what	they	did,	how	they	worked,	and	who
shaped	them.	Noting	discrepancies	between	the	theory	and	practice	of	colonial	administration,	the	chapter	shows	that
colonial	administration	was	far	more	diffuse	and	less	closely	coordinated	than	official	discourses	of	governance
suggested.	The	performance	of	colonialism	involved	a	wide	range	of	actors:	not	only	European	military	and	civilian	elites
and	African	chiefs,	but	also	African	translators	and	tax	collectors,	as	well	as	European	forestry	experts,	missionaries,
anthropologists,	and	settlers.	The	chapter	also	considers	debates	over	reconciling	the	violence	and	exploitation	of
colonial	states	with	their	claims	to,	and	aspirations	for,	social	development	in	Africa,	particularly	in	light	of	their
relationship	to	the	postcolonial	states	that	succeeded	them.
Keywords:	colonialism,	imperialism,	nationalism,	postcolonialism,	development,	labour	control,	colonial	states,	colonial	conquests,	migration.
IN	February	2005,	the	National	Assembly	of	France	passed	a	law	that	asserted	‘the	positive	role	of	the	French	presence
abroad,	especially	in	North	Africa’,	while	directing	educators	to	undertake	the	‘positive	presentation	of	[French]
colonialism’	to	schoolchildren.	A	year	later,	France’s	president,	Jacques	Chirac,	repealed	this	law	in	an	effort	to	defuse
what	historian	Benjamin	Stora	called	the	‘dangerous	war	of	memories’,	which	threatened	to	rupture	diplomatic	relations
between	France	and	its	former	settler	colony,	Algeria. 	If	anyone	had	thought	that	the	history	of	European	imperialism
and	colonial	rule	in	Africa	was	decided,	then	this	episode	and	the	public	debate	it	generated	quickly	dispelled	that	idea.
Among	professional	historians	too,	debates	about	the	nature	of	colonial	rule	in	Africa	have	continued	to	simmer.	Writing
in	1990	for	the	UNESCO-sponsored	General	History	of	Africa,	the	distinguished	Ghanaian	historian	Adu	Boahen	argued
that	‘the	colonial	rulers	had	one	principal	end	in	view,	the	ruthless	exploitation	of	the	resources	of	Africa	for	the	sole
benefit	of	colonial	powers	and	their	mercantile,	mining,	and	financial	companies	in	the	metropolitan	countries’.	By
contrast,	Roland	Oliver	and	J.	D.	Fage,	who	helped	to	establish	the	academic	field	of	African	history	in	Britain,	portrayed
colonial	rule	more	benignly.	Also	writing	in	1990,	they	suggested	that	colonial	governments	had	aimed	to	‘maintain	peace
and	the	rule	of	law’	and,	from	the	1920s,	to	fulfil	their	growing	sense	of	‘moral	obligation’	to	develop	African	societies.
Despite	these	differences	of	interpretation,	Boahen	and	Oliver	and	Fage	shared	basic	assumptions	about	how	colonial
states	worked.	They	assumed,	first,	that	Europeans	were	colonizers,	that	Africans	were	colonized,	and	that	the
distinctions	between	them	were	clear.	They	assumed,	second,	that	colonial	states	formulated	and	applied	policies	with	a
high	degree	of	coherence,	so	that	the	theory	and	practice	of	rule	converged.
Recent	scholarship	in	African	history	suggests	a	more	complex	picture.	Many	more	people—and	more	kinds	of	people—
than	previously	assumed	were	involved	in	shaping	colonial	states:	not	only	African	chiefs	and	European	military	men	and
civilian	elites	(such	as	British	District	Officers	and	French	commandants	de	cercle),	but	also,	for	example,	African
translators,	schoolteachers,	and	tax	collectors,	as	well	as	European	forestry	(p.	152)	 experts,	missionaries,	and
anthropologists.	Viewed	in	this	way,	the	lines	between	colonized	and	colonizer	look	blurrier.	Likewise,	colonial
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administration	was	far	more	diffuse	and	less	closely	coordinated	than	official	discourses	of	governance	suggested,	so	that
colonial	states	exerted	their	considerable	power	in	ways	that	were	often	arbitrary,	variable,	and	contingent	on	decisions
made	by	individuals	in	local	settings.	In	cities	such	as	Paris,	Brussels,	and	London,	or	Conakry,	Léopoldville	(Kinshasa),
and	Khartoum,	the	ostensible	architects	of	colonial	policies	had	less	influence	over	colonial	statecraft,	as	practised	on	the
ground,	than	they	either	wanted	or	knew.	In	short,	as	historians	reach	deep	into	the	colonial	archives	of	former	imperial
powers	and	of	African	states,	they	now	realize	that	the	day-to-day	articulation	of	colonialism	was	more	complicated	than
once	thought:	‘more	a	multitude	of	discordant	voices	than	the	monotonous	drone	of	imperial	hegemony’.
This	chapter	sketches	a	history	of	colonial	states	in	Africa,	explaining	when	and	why	they	emerged,	what	they	did,	how
they	worked,	and	who	made	them	what	they	were.	At	the	same	time,	it	aims	to	explain	the	historiography	of	colonial
states;	that	is,	the	different	ways	that	historians	have	interpreted	their	nature,	their	impact,	and	their	legacies.
The	Creation	of	Colonial	States
During	the	closing	years	of	the	nineteenth	century	and	opening	years	of	the	twentieth,	seven	European	countries	claimed
territories	in	Africa	and	devised	administrations	within	them.	These	were	Britain,	France,	Germany,	Belgium	(initially
through	King	Leopold’s	private	initiative),	Portugal,	Spain,	and	Italy.	For	decades,	historians	have	described	this
expansion	as	the	result	of	a	‘new	imperialism’,	which	stood	in	contrast	with	Europe’s	‘old’	imperialism	shaped	by
maritime	trade	in	the	Atlantic	and	Indian	Ocean	worlds	and	which	arose	from	new	motives.	These	included	a	desire	to
enhance	national	prestige,	to	guarantee	access	to	African	raw	materials	and	markets	for	European	industrial	goods,	and
to	control	strategic	concerns	such	as	waterways.	For	citizens	of	colonizing	countries,	African	colonial	states	also	offered
prospects	of	employment,	adventure,	Christian	endeavour,	and	personal	gain.	Thus,	European	governments,
corporations,	missions,	and	individuals	found	stakes	in	the	colonial	enterprise.	Yet	Africans	seized	or	created
opportunities,	too,	and	in	the	process	pushed	the	history	of	colonial	states	down	unexpected	paths.
The	colonial	partition,	the	so-called	Scramble	for	Africa,	is	hard	to	date	precisely,	but	precipitating	events	included
France’s	occupation	of	Tunisia	in	1881	and	Britain’s	occupation	of	Egypt	in	1882.	Otto	von	Bismarck,	chancellor	of	the
newly	unified	Germany,	was	concerned	about	this	land	grab,	but	eager	also	to	get	a	share	of	the	booty.	Thus	Bismarck
called	a	meeting	in	Berlin	and	invited	representatives	of	European	states	that	were	vying	for	African	territories.	Ultimately,
the	Berlin	Conference	of	1884–5	regulated	this	free-for-all.	Contestants	agreed	to	recognize	the	spheres	of	influence
that	some	states	were	already	claiming	or	eyeing,	and	agreed,	too,	that	countries	could	only	(p.	153)	 confirm	their	hold
on	territories	by	demonstrating	‘effective	occupation’;	that	is,	by	developing	infrastructures	for	colonial	rule.	The	latter
provision	changed	the	nature	of	European	imperialism	in	Africa.	Henceforth,	European	powers	insisted	on	their	right	and
need	to	impose	strong	centralized	rule	over	colonies,	and	presumed	authority	to	dictate	policies	and	extract	taxes	within
their	borders.	At	the	same	time,	they	invoked	a	‘civilizing	mission’	to	justify	their	actions,	claiming	to	spread	religious
values,	rational	thought,	liberty,	justice,	and	other	glorious	abstractions.
To	appreciate	the	difference	between	the	old	and	new	imperialism	in	Africa,	one	can	cite	Portugal,	which	claimed	a
longer	history	of	engagement	in	the	continent	than	any	other	party	to	the	Scramble.	In	1415,	Portugal	colonized	the
enclave	of	Ceuta	(now	claimed	by	Spain,	but	surrounded	by	Morocco).	It	did	the	same	in	Guinea	(now	Guinea-Bissau)	in
1446,	the	Cape	Verde	Islands	in	1462,	and	the	islands	of	Fernando	Pó	and	Annobón	(now	part	of	Equatorial	Guinea)	in
1472.	Portuguese	merchants	and	later	chartered	companies	established	trading	enclaves	along	Africa’s	south-western
and	south-eastern	coasts.	This	history	enabled	Portugal,	after	the	Berlin	Conference,	to	stake	claims	to	what	became
Angola	and	Mozambique,	and	to	establish	ruling	infrastructures	within	their	interiors.	Likewise,	Spanish	colonialism	in
Africa	took	new	turns	after	the	Scramble,	as	Spanish	Guinea	(Equatorial	Guinea)	shows.	In	1778,	through	an	exchange
with	Portugal	for	land	in	America,	Spain	claimed	the	island	of	Fernando	Pó	along	with	commercial	rights	to	the	adjacent
coastal	enclave	of	Río	Muni.	For	decades	Spain	loosely	administered	this	territory	from	Argentina,	in	an	arrangement	that
attested	to	the	bonds	of	empire	stretching	across	the	Atlantic.	Yet,	it	was	only	in	1904	(a	full	126	years	after	Portugal
ceded	control,	and	twenty	years	after	the	Berlin	Conference)	that	Spain	began	to	coordinate	an	administration	in	this
territory,	and	only	by	1927	that	it	began	to	govern	effectively	Spanish	Guinea’s	mainland	interior.
European	technological	advances	enabled	this	new	imperialism:	medicinal	quinine	(for	averting	malaria,	thereby	enabling
Europeans	to	survive	in	the	tropics),	rapid-firing	rifles	and	machine	guns,	steamships,	the	Suez	Canal	(opened	in	1869),
submarine	telegraph	cables,	railways,	and	macadamized	roads	(the	last	allowing	for	transport	of	goods	by	lorry).	New
image-	and	text-producing	technologies,	such	as	cameras	and	typewriters	(with	their	potential	for	carbon	copies	and
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mimeographs)	became	indispensable,	too,	as	they	enabled	colonial	states	to	record,	classify,	and	publicize,	to	conduct
surveillance	and	gather	intelligence,	and	to	register	and	enshrine	property	rights.	Innovations	continued	in	the	twentieth
century,	with	advances	in	auditory	devices	such	as	radios.	Meanwhile,	in	military	technology,	Italy	introduced	aeroplanes
as	a	new	tool	of	empire,	dropping	hand-held	bombs	on	Arab	encampments	during	its	1911	battle	to	wrest	Libya	from	the
Ottoman	Empire.	Later	other	European	powers	in	Africa	(such	as	Britain	in	the	southern	Sudan)	also	engaged	in	aerial
bombardment,	in	an	attempt	to	‘pacify’	people	who	refused	to	submit	to	colonial	control.
Italy’s	invasion	of	Libya	in	1911	presents	one	conventional	end-date	for	the	Scramble	for	Africa;	France’s	imposition	of	a
military	protectorate	over	Morocco	in	1912	another.	H.	L.	Wesseling	has	recently	argued,	however,	that	the	French
seizure	of	Morocco	was	a	mere	epilogue	to	the	Scramble,	and	that	the	Peace	of	Vereeniging,	which	(p.	154)	 ended
the	South	African	War	of	1899	to	1902,	was	the	real	watershed	for	its	closure. 	The	final	defeat	by	British	imperial	forces
of	the	two	independent	settler	republics	established	by	Afrikaans-speaking	agriculturalists	or	‘Boers’	secured	British
control	over	all	of	South	Africa	and	hence	mercantile	access	to	the	gold	mines	of	the	Transvaal.	A	critical	figure	in	British
imperial	expansion	within	southern	Africa	was	the	diamond	magnate	Cecil	Rhodes,	after	whom	the	two	British
‘Rhodesias’,	Northern	and	Southern	(now	Zambia	and	Zimbabwe)	were	named.	The	British	economist	J.	A.	Hobson
(1858–1940),	who	covered	the	South	African	War	for	the	Manchester	Guardian,	was	surely	thinking	of	Rhodes	when	he
wrote	his	brilliant	analysis	and	scathing	indictment	titled	Imperialism.	‘Finance’,	wrote	Hobson	in	1902,	‘manipulates	the
patriotic	forces	which	politicians,	soldiers,	philanthropists,	and	traders	generate’,	thereby	serving	as	motors	of	imperial
expansion.
At	the	opposite,	northern	extreme	of	the	continent	lay	the	French	white	settler	state	of	Algeria.	As	a	case	study	in	the
history	of	colonial	expansion	in	Africa,	Algeria	was	also	somewhat	exceptional,	because	its	initial	conquest	in	1830
predated	the	Scramble	by	some	fifty	years.	Yet	in	other	ways	its	experiences	were	emblematic	of	trends	elsewhere	in
Africa—a	point	that	Frantz	Fanon	(1925–61),	the	Martinique-born	‘psychopathologist	of	colonialism’	strongly	emphasized.
Like	South	Africa,	Kenya,	and	Southern	Rhodesia,	Algeria	became	a	settler	colony,	although	in	this	case	French
authorities	welcomed	Europeans	not	only	from	mainland	France	but	also	from	Malta,	Corsica,	Sicily,	and	mainland	Italy.
As	a	settler	society,	Algeria	developed	a	clear	hierarchy	of	privilege,	which	recognized	European	Christians	as	citizens
but	subjected	the	majority	Arabic-	and	Berber-speaking	Muslims	to	a	series	of	harsh	penalties,	commonly	known	as	the
indigénat,	which	France	later	exported	to	all	its	colonies	in	West	and	Central	Africa.	Algeria’s	harsh	colonial	system
exploded	in	1954	into	a	struggle	for	liberation	that	ended	with	French	withdrawal	in	1962	and	with	the	‘repatriation’	of
one	million	holders	of	French	citizenship	(many	of	whom	had	never	seen,	or	had	no	known	ancestral	connections	to
France).
Four	countries	stand	out	as	anomalous	cases	in	this	history	of	African	colonial	states.	The	first	was	Liberia,	which	had
been	colonized	from	the	1820s	by	African	Americans	who	had	been	freed	from	slavery	in	the	United	States	and	who
declared	independence	in	1847	with	help	from	the	American	Colonization	Society.	The	second	was	Ethiopia,	which
retained	independence—and	its	Orthodox	Christian	monarchy—largely	by	juggling	the	demands	of	competing	European
players,	among	whom	were	influential	cadres	of	merchants	and	missionaries.	However,	in	1935–6,	Italy—by	then	under
the	leadership	of	Fascist	dictator	Benito	Mussolini—conquered	Ethiopia,	but	held	the	country	for	only	five	years.	The	third
case	was	South	Africa,	which	emerged	in	1910	as	a	tense	union	of	British-	and	Afrikaner-dominated	regions	that	applied
racial	policies	empowering	‘whites’	and	restricting	the	rights	of	‘natives’	or	‘blacks’,	as	well	as	‘coloureds’	(mixed
heritage	people)	and	people	of	Indian	origin.	The	fourth	was	the	Anglo-Egyptian	Sudan,	which	from	1898	had	a	peculiar
status	as	a	‘condominium’,	or	shared	domain,	of	Britain	and	Egypt.	Egypt	itself	had	claims	to	Sudanese	territory	that	dated
from	a	‘Turco-Egyptian’	conquest	in	1820,	although	Sudanese	Muslim	fighters	had	ousted	the	Egyptian	colonizers	in	the
early	1880s.
(p.	155)	 The	borders	that	emerged	from	the	Scramble	were	often	arbitrary.	Some	reflected	prior	claims,	while	others
were	set	through	the	trading	of	favours.	For	example,	Britain	secured	parts	of	northern	Nigeria	relative	to	France’s
Niger	in	return	for	recognizing	French	fishing	rights	off	the	Newfoundland	coast. 	In	1911,	France	agreed	to	the
extension	of	German	Cameroon	by	giving	it	two	pieces	of	territory	along	its	southern	and	eastern	fringes;	in	return,
Germany	recognized	France’s	free	rein	in	Morocco.	Even	when	officials	sought	to	revise	frontiers	in	light	of	physical	and
cultural	topographies,	the	results	were	sometimes	whimsical.	In	1913,	for	example,	Britain	sent	men	to	tweak	the
borders	of	two	British-controlled	territories,	the	Sudan	and	Uganda,	with	directions	to	account	for	the	flow	of	Nile	waters
and	the	integrity	of	African	‘tribes’.	Captain	Kelly,	the	British	officer	who	came	from	the	Sudan	side	and	who	clearly	felt	a
sense	of	team	loyalty,	contemplated	securing	two	particular	communities	of	Acholi	people	for	the	Sudan	because	‘their
fondness	for	clothes	and	such	marks	of	civilisation	as	brass	bands’	made	them	‘progressive’	and	thus	‘worth	having’. 	The
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most	significant	reorganization	of	colonial	jurisdiction	was	the	confiscation	of	Germany’s	overseas	empire	following	its
defeat	in	the	First	World	War.	Its	four	African	colonies,	Togo,	Cameroon,	German	East	Africa	(now	Tanzania,	Rwanda,
and	Burundi),	and	German	South-West	Africa	(Namibia),	were	apportioned	by	the	League	of	Nations	as	‘mandates’
under	British,	French,	Belgian,	and,	in	the	case	of	South-West	Africa,	South	African	stewardship.
Colonial	States	in	Theory	and	Practice
A	recurring	theme	in	the	history	of	Africa’s	colonial	states	is	that	they	did	not	emerge,	develop,	or	function	in	isolation.
Frederick	Lugard	(1858–1945)	was	one	of	the	most	important	players	in	the	British	Empire	during	the	age	of	new
imperialism.	So	extensive	was	his	career	that	his	biographer	later	chronicled	it	in	two	hefty	volumes	subtitled	The	Years	of
Adventure	and	The	Years	of	Authority. 	Born	in	India,	Lugard	attended	the	Royal	Military	Academy	at	Sandhurst.	He	went
on	to	serve	in	campaigns	in	Afghanistan,	the	Sudan,	Nyasaland	(Malawi),	and	Burma,	to	represent	British	commercial
interests	in	exploratory	expeditions	in	eastern	and	southern	Africa,	and	to	hold	appointments	as	Military	Administrator	of
Uganda,	High	Commissioner	of	Northern	Nigeria,	Governor	of	Hong	Kong,	and	Governor	of	Nigeria.	Lugard’s	Nigerian
years	were	the	most	important	of	his	career.	Huge,	populous,	and	richly	diverse	in	cultures	and	terrains,	Nigeria
provided	a	laboratory	for	experiments	in	‘indirect	rule’,	a	method	and	philosophy	of	administration	that	Lugard	later
described	in	his	famous	The	Dual	Mandate	in	British	Tropical	Africa	(1922).
Indirect	rule	meant	identifying	and	cultivating	local	chiefs	and	other	hereditary	rulers,	and	then	using	them	as
intermediaries	in	colonial	governance.	As	described	by	Lugard,	indirect	rule	worked	from	the	premise	that	Britain
possessed	a	‘dual	mandate’	to,	on	the	one	hand,	colonize	territories	and	extract	wealth	from	them	and,	on	the	other,	to
help	backward	peoples	to	progress.	Indeed,	Lugard	held	strong	views	(p.	156)	 about	Africans	as	‘primitives’	and	‘child
races	of	the	world’,	‘for	whose	welfare	we	are	responsible’. 	A	third	assumption	about	indirect	rule	rested	on	the
romantic,	if	delusional,	premise	that	Britain	could	preserve	‘authentic’	and	‘traditional’	local	cultures	while	shielding
Africans	from	modern	conditions.	Along	these	lines,	Lugard	wrote	with	contempt	about	‘Europeanised	Africans’—whom
others	called	‘detribalized	blacks’—and	stressed	the	need	to	avoid	making	more	of	them.	Through	skilful	administration,
Lugard	suggested,	it	would	be	possible	for	Britain	to	get	rich	off	Africa,	reform	and	save	Africans,	but	stop	the	clock	on
change.	His	writing	inspired	a	generation	of	British	colonial	careerists,	while	his	model	of	indirect	rule	became	Britain’s
pan-African	policy,	even	if	British	colonial	states	applied	the	idea	differently	from	region	to	region.
France	had	its	own	lofty	ideals	for	colonial	rule,	at	the	heart	of	which	was	the	so-called	mission	civilisatrice,	or	civilizing
mission.	Its	goal	was	to	propagate	the	best	of	French	culture	along	with	the	rationalist	and	libertarian	values	deriving
from	the	Enlightenment	and	French	Revolution.	Before	1914	especially,	French	colonial	authorities	emphasized	a	vision
of	civilization	that	would	‘improve	their	subjects’	standard	of	living	through	the	rational	development,	or	what	the	French
called	the	mise	en	valeur,	of	the	colonies’	natural	and	human	resources’	by,	for	example,	building	railroads,	improving
public	hygiene,	and	promoting	justice	through	the	application	of	law. 	In	contrast	with	the	British,	French	authorities
tended	to	eliminate	chiefs	who	got	in	their	way	and	felt	little	sentimentality	about	protecting	‘tradition’.	Also	unlike	British
authorities,	who	supported	or	tolerated	the	policy	of	Christian	missionary	schools	in	using	African	vernaculars	as	media
for	instruction,	French	colonial	authorities	promoted	French—the	proverbial	lingua	franca—consistently	throughout	their
domains.	French	colonial	policy	also	promoted	‘assimilation’	(suggesting	large-scale	adoption	of	French	ways),	or	in	its
modified	form,	‘association’	(implying	partial	acculturation).	It	also	recognized	a	tiny	number	of	educated	Africans	who
embraced	the	French	language	and	French	ways	as	évolués	(‘evolved	ones’),	and	granted	them	a	degree	of	citizenship.
In	1936,	only	2,000	out	of	some	14	million	French	West	Africans	enjoyed	évolué	status,	not	including	the	80,000	African
inhabitants	of	the	four	old	coastal	communes	of	Senegal,	to	which	France	had	awarded	special	privileges	in	1848.
In	1925,	the	distinguished	anthropologist	Lucien	Lévy-Bruhl,	whose	institute	of	ethnology	at	the	University	of	Paris
depended	on	colonial	subsidies,	explained	the	importance	of	rational	study	to	colonial	rule.	‘When	a	colony	includes
peoples	with	a	civilization	inferior	to,	or	very	different	from,	our	own,	competent	ethnologists	may	be	just	as	urgently
required	as	competent	engineers,	foresters	or	physicians.’	Native	populations,	he	continued,	were	as	critical	as	natural
resources	like	mines	and	forests	in	accounting	for	a	colony’s	wealth,	and	required	inventories	in	the	form	of	‘precise,	in-
depth	knowledge	of…languages,	religions,	and	social	forms’. 	Although	Lévy-Bruhl	was	writing	with	French	territories	in
mind,	his	observations	apply	equally	to	those	of	other	European	powers	in	Africa,	which	emphasized	their	rationalism	as	a
justification	for	colonial	rule.	By	encouraging	the	scholarly	analysis	of	everything	from	folktales	and	marriage	customs	to
native	flowers	and	endemic	diseases,	colonial	powers	sought	to	demonstrate	mastery	to	themselves	and	to	others
through	the	production	of	knowledge.	(p.	157)	 In	this	way,	too,	academic	disciplines	such	as	anthropology	and	tropical
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medicine	became	indebted	to	the	colonial	states	that	fostered	them	during	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth
centuries.
All	colonial	powers	in	Africa	desired	to	extract	profits	from	colonies	and	to	keep	the	costs	of	administration	in	check.	For
Germany,	the	historian	Hans-Ulrich	Wehler	has	argued,	money-making	was	particularly	important,	as	Bismarck	hoped	that
economic	success	and	opportunities	abroad	would	serve	as	a	release	valve	for	rising	social	pressures	at	home.	German
colonies	in	Africa	became	‘an	integrative	force	in	a	recently	founded	state	which	lacked	stabilising	historical	traditions	and
which	was	unable	to	conceal	its	sharp	class	divisions’. 	Italy,	too,	was	a	newly	unified	state	that	hoped	to	make	money	in
Africa,	while	exporting	surplus	population	as	settlers.	For	Italy,	after	the	conquest	of	Libya	in	1911–12,	the	historical
romance	of	African	colonization	was	also	critical,	since	it	allowed	for	the	proliferation	of	nationalist	fantasies	about
reviving	the	Roman	Empire	on	both	shores	of	the	Mediterranean.
In	German	colonies,	the	Congo	Free	State,	Portuguese,	Spanish,	and	Italian	territories,	and	some	French	and	British
domains,	policy-makers	hoped	to	pass	costs	of	administration	to	private	companies	in	a	process	that	one	might	describe
as	the	subcontracting	of	colonial	rule.	Examples	of	companies	that	benefited	from	such	arrangements	include	the
Portuguese	Companhia	de	Moçambique,	the	German	Deutsche	Kolonialgesellschaft	für	Südwest-Afrika,	and	the	Belgian
Compagnie	du	Congo	Belge.	Companies	justified	territorial	claims	and	maintained	order;	in	return	they	gained	access	to
labour	and	profits.	Christian	missionaries	also	featured	as	proxies	in	this	model	of	colonial	statecraft.	Authorities	hoped
that	missionaries	would	provide	welfare	services	(such	as	clinics	for	the	sick),	open	schools	to	train	Africans	as	workers
and	colonial	servants,	and	bolster	the	moral	legitimacy	of	colonialism.	In	return,	the	theory	went,	missionaries	gained
access	to	souls.
Yet	theory	diverged	from	practice	in	manifold	ways.	Financially,	colonial	states	seldom	made	the	profits	for	which
European	governments	and	companies	had	hoped;	that	is,	profits	sufficient	to	cover	the	costs	of	administration	and	then
some.	Certain	regions	had	more	trading	potential	than	others,	depending	upon	a	range	of	environmental	and	human
factors	including	the	presence	of	exploitable	raw	materials,	cash	crops,	and	workers.	Eventually,	France	found	an
accounting	trick	to	offset	its	costs	as	well	as	the	regional	variations	in	wealth	by	making	its	richest	colonies,	such	as	Côte
d’Ivoire	and	Gabon,	subsidize	the	poorest,	such	as	Haute-Volta	(Upper	Volta,	now	Burkina	Faso)	and	Oubangui-Chari
(Central	African	Republic).	Commercially,	big	firms	were	expected	to	behave	in	ways	that	would	foster	social	and
economic	stability,	but	companies	were	often	rapacious.	This	was	particularly	so	in	the	rainforests	of	Belgian-	and
French-ruled	equatorial	Africa,	where	in	the	1890s	and	1900s,	so-called	concessionary	companies	hell-bent	on	the
extraction	of	rubber	in	order	to	turn	a	quick	profit	inflicted	widespread	and	systematic	violence	upon	village	communities.
When	news	of	atrocities	in	the	Congo	Free	State	leaked	out,	the	result	was	the	rise	of	modern	international	human	rights
activism	in	the	form	of	the	Congo	Reform	Association	and,	in	1908,	the	handing	of	King	Leopold’s	personal	fiefdom	over
to	the	Belgian	state.
(p.	158)	 In	terms	of	governance,	Liberté,	égalité,	fraternité	may	have	reigned	at	home,	but	in	France’s	African	empire
despotism	was	really	the	king,	with	the	result	that	colonial	law	in	practice	amounted	to	a	kind	of	‘rule	by	decree,	enacted
in	often	arbitrary	and	sometimes	spectacular	punishments’. 	Meanwhile,	British	rulers	did	not	merely	preserve	African
chiefdoms	and	customs;	in	some	cases	they	invented	them,	or	at	least	assembled	them	from	a	jumble	of	parts,	while	in
other	cases	African	chiefs	invented	or	reinvented	themselves. 	Assessing	French	colonial	practice	in	light	of	the	high
ideals	of	colonial	rhetoric,	one	historian	has	concluded	that	French	colonization	in	the	early	twentieth	century	functioned
largely	as	‘an	act	of	state-sanctioned	violence’. 	Yet	violence	has	arguably	remained	a	defining	feature	of	all	states	in
history,	not	only	those	that	have	arisen	in	colonies.	The	German	sociologist	Max	Weber	(1864–1920)	famously	defined
the	state	as	an	‘institutional	association	of	rule’	(Herrschaftsverband),	endowed	with	a	territorial	entity,	that	‘lays	claim	to
the	monopoly	of	legitimate	physical	violence’	in	the	enforcement	of	its	order. 	Building	on	Weber,	others	have	defined
the	state	more	recently	as	‘an	administrative	apparatus	where	administration	means	the	extraction	of	resources,	control,
and	coercion,	and	maintenance	of	the	political,	legal,	and	normative	order	in	society’. 	The	colonial	states	of	Africa
certainly	claimed	monopolies	of	violence,	in	the	Weberian	sense	of	the	term.	Colonial	states	were	economic	as	well	as
political	enterprises,	often	committed	to	the	extraction	of	natural	resources,	to	the	development	of	trade,	and	in	the	view
of	critics	like	Vladimir	Lenin	(1870–1924),	who	wrote	a	famous	treatise	against	imperialism	in	1916,	to	the	promotion	of
private	business	interests	in	the	form	of	‘cartels	and	monopolies’.
Of	course,	empires	are	states,	too,	even	if	they	are	often	giants	in	relation	to	individual	colonies.	As	Jane	Burbank	and
Frederick	Cooper	have	recently	noted,	empires	are	highly	stratified	states,	‘self-consciously	maintaining	the	diversity	of
people	they	[have]	conquered	and	incorporated’.	At	the	same	time,	empires	are	populated	by	historical	actors	who	are
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constantly	‘pushing	and	tugging	on	relationships	with	those	above	and	below	them,	changing	but	only	sometimes
breaking	the	lines	of	authority	and	power’. 	Historians	are	now	making	similar	claims	about	the	tug-and-pull	of	authority
and	the	diffusion	of	power	within	Africa’s	colonial	states.
Work,	Control,	and	Coercion
Collecting	taxes	was	a	paramount	concern	of	colonial	states.	So	was	controlling	labour.	Colonial	rule	depended	on
African	labour	to	build	and	to	maintain	infrastructure,	from	roads,	railways,	bridges,	and	telegraph	lines	to	government
offices	and	rest-houses.	Colonial	sources	emphasized	the	importance	of	male	labour,	but	in	many	places	women	were
also	involved.	Early	twentieth-century	photographs	from	the	Sudan,	for	example,	show	largely	female	crews	engaged	in
the	hard	physical	labour	of	digging	Nile	dams.	In	response	to	these	needs	for	‘manpower’,	colonial	states	imposed
various	demands	for	compulsory	labour.	These	ranged	from	twelve	days	a	year	in	French	colonies	to	(p.	159)	 forty
hours	a	week	in	the	Congo	Free	State	from	1903	to	1908	(subsequently	revised	to	sixty	days	a	year	in	the	Belgian
Congo)—although	in	reality	people	were	often	forced	to	work	for	longer.	Most	British	colonies	ended	forced	labour	in
the	1920s,	but	until	then,	in	what	is	now	Uganda,	the	demand	was	so	onerous	that	‘a	Ganda	peasant	might	theoretically
owe	five	months’	labour	a	year:	one	month	(in	lieu	of	rent)	to	his	African	landlord,	one	month	of	local	community	labour,
two	months	(in	lieu	of	tax)	to	the	state,	and	one	month	of	compulsory	paid	(kasanvu)	labour	for	the	state	or	(rarely)	a
private	employer’. 	In	the	African-American	colony	of	Liberia	and	in	the	Portuguese	colonies,	forced	labour	remained
on	the	books	until	the	early	1960s.	Of	course,	Europeans	were	not	the	first	modern	imperialists	to	devise	massive	and
often	brutal	forced	labour	schemes	in	Africa.	That	distinction	goes	to	Muhammad	Ali	(1769–1849),	the	Ottoman	governor
and	dynasty-builder	of	Egypt,	who	rounded	up	vast	numbers	of	Egyptian	peasants	in	the	early	nineteenth	century	and
forced	them	to	dig	irrigation	canals,	operate	textile	factories,	and	fight	in	his	army.
Colonial	states	also	introduced	taxes	in	cash	and	eliminated	earlier	currencies.	In	that	part	of	French	Equatorial	Africa
now	containing	Chad	and	the	Central	African	Republic,	authorities	in	1900	imposed	a	head	tax	only	on	adults—but	then
defined	adults	as	people	over	the	age	of	eight. 	The	need	for	cash	to	pay	taxes	compelled	many	Africans	to	leave	their
communities	for	wage-paying	jobs	in	mostly	European-controlled	enterprises,	such	as	mines,	factories,	or,	on	farms	(as
in	colonies	of	white	settlement	such	as	Kenya).	Across	the	continent,	the	mobilization	of	labour	by	colonial	states	gave
rise	to	large-scale	migrations.	As	workers	found	that	long	distances	and	meagre	incomes	kept	them	from	visiting	their
families,	migration	in	turn	led	to	de	facto	resettlement	and	urbanization.	‘Certainly,	by	the	later	1930s,’	wrote	one
historian	with	regard	to	the	copper-mining	economy	of	Northern	Rhodesia	(Zambia),	‘it	was	becoming	increasingly
difficult	to	maintain	the	fiction	that	Copperbelt	workers	were	essentially	rural	tribesmen,	temporarily	working	away	from
their	homes.’ 	Equally	untenable,	given	this	new	urbanization,	was	the	romantic	Lugardian	idea	of	preserving	‘traditional’
African	village	cultures	intact.	Some	colonial-era	labour	migrations	anticipated	postcolonial	trends	of	African	migration	to
Western	Europe.	Amidst	the	labour	shortages	of	the	First	World	War,	France	pressed	300,000	Algerian	Muslim	males	to
cross	the	Mediterranean	in	order	to	fill	jobs	in	French	factories;	by	1939,	approximately	one	in	five	Algerian	men	had
worked	for	some	time	in	France.
Mobilizing	labour	required	coercion.	After	1905	in	the	Uele	valley	of	the	Belgian	Congo,	where	one	company	demanded
a	massive	labour	supply	for	extracting	and	refining	gold,	‘recruits	on	their	way	to	the	mines	were	at	times	linked	with
ropes	around	their	necks’. 	In	Northern	Rhodesia,	mining	companies	and	the	state	used	force	to	round	up	workers	and
march	them	towards	the	south.	Most	of	these	collected	workers	were	men.	In	some	places,	such	as	Swaziland,	colonial
officials	supported	efforts	of	local	chiefs	as	they	tried	to	restrict	the	labour	migration	of	women—with	important
consequences	for	the	history	of	gender	relations,	family	structures,	patriarchal	authority,	and	rural–urban	connections.
The	new	cash	economy	also	made	Africans	into	buyers	of	European	industrial	goods,	introducing	new	cultures	of
consumerism.	In	Southern	Rhodesia,	for	(p.	160)	 example,	European	manufacturers	marketed	Lifebuoy-brand	soap	to
African	men,	in	the	process	revising	conceptions	of	personal	hygiene.
What	was	the	difference	between	using	coercion	to	mobilize	labour	and	using	coercion	to	impose	control?	The	answer
was,	often,	not	much.	Colonial	states	relied	on	an	array	of	coercive	bodies,	notably	armies	and	police	forces,	but	also	on
innocuously	named	‘labour	bureaus’	(as	in	Northern	Rhodesia)	as	well	as	the	private	militias	that	some	chiefs	maintained.
Moreover,	these	coercive	bodies	sometimes	claimed	significant	autonomy	and	pursued	their	own	corporate	interests
relative	to	other	parts	of	colonial	states.	Consider	the	case	of	German	East	Africa,	where	during	the	1890s	the	colonial
army	was	an	agent	of	chaos.	The	German	Foreign	Office	created	a	force	called	the	Schutztruppen,	made	up	of	German
army	volunteers	and	African	conscripts	and	charged	with	promoting	security	and	stability	so	that	German	business	could
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prosper.	But	on	the	ground	in	East	Africa,	German	military	officers	had	other	ideas:	between	1891	and	1897	they	fought
more	than	sixty	campaigns	against	local	peoples,	but	only	reported	the	biggest	ones	back	to	Berlin.	‘Local	military
commanders’,	observed	one	historian,	‘often	secretly	conducted	smaller	campaigns,	of	which	even	the	governor	was	not
subsequently	fully	informed.’	To	quell	opposition,	the	Schutztruppen	resorted	to	burning	villages,	plundering	livestock
and	food,	and	adopting	‘a	strategy	of	systematic	starvation’	among	civilians.	Amidst	the	instability	that	they	created,	military
officers	created	an	impression	of	their	own	indispensability	to	the	colonial	state	and	thereby	engineered	‘the	militarization
of	colonial	policy’	in	German	East	Africa.
In	other	colonies	the	lines	dividing	soldiers	(theoretically	waging	wars	or	defending	territories)	from	police	(theoretically
maintaining	law	and	order)	were	blurry.	Consider	the	colonial	police	force	of	the	Gold	Coast	(Ghana):	this	evolved	from	an
armed	frontier	force	first	established	in	1865	and	modelled	on	a	combination	of	the	Royal	Irish	Constabulary	and	Indian
and	Egyptian	paramilitary	forces.	Authorities	recruited	‘Hausas’,	by	which	they	meant	Muslim	men	from	the	northern
interior,	and	deployed	them	in	various	ways,	from	consolidating	the	British	conquest	of	the	Asante	and	Northern
Territories	region	in	the	1896–1900	period,	to	breaking	strikes	and	labour	disputes,	and	supervising	convict	labourers
and	guarding	banks.	These	‘Hausa’	men,	who	enjoyed	opportunities	to	rise	through	the	ranks,	came	to	wield
considerable	power,	in	some	places	acting	as	magistrates	by	judging	local	criminal	and	civil	cases.	As	David	Killingray
notes:
All	too	often	a	uniform	seemed	a	license	to	loot	and	extort,	and	as	a	result	both	the	Hausa	Constabulary	and	the
Fante	police	were	despised	and	hated	by	those	they	affected	to	police.	Preeminently	they	were	hated	as
unaccountable	representatives	of	an	alien	colonial	power	imposing	a	range	of	new	laws	and	measures	of	social
control	which	lacked	any	semblance	of	popular	consent.
Who	did	the	coercing	in	African	colonial	states?	Who	did	the	conquering,	policing,	rounding	up,	and	clamping	down?
Europeans	stood	at	the	top	of	the	hierarchy,	but	Africans	contributed	heavily	to	colonial	armed	forces	as	well.	The	vast
majority	of	soldiers	in	all	colonial	armies	were	Africans,	led	by	small	numbers	of	European	officers.	Some	Africans	may
have	voluntarily	joined	colonial	armies	or	police	forces,	but	many	(p.	161)	 more	were	drafted	or	otherwise	coerced	into
joining;	once	in,	they	found	opportunities	for	adventure,	steady	employment,	and	the	enhancement	of	social	status.	Thus,
France	achieved	its	conquest	of	Dahomey	in	1892–4	using	its	West	African	recruits,	the	so-called	Tirailleurs	Sénégalais
(‘Senegalese	Riflemen’).	The	Anglo-Egyptian	forces	that	defeated	the	Sudan’s	Mahdist	state	in	1898	consisted	largely	of
men	of	Sudanese	origin,	while	the	Italian	forces	that	conquered	Libya	in	1911	consisted	largely	of	Eritreans.	During	the
First	World	War,	Belgians	in	the	Congo	sent	African	soldiers	of	the	Force	Publique	to	invade	German	East	Africa	and
occupy	Ruanda-Urundi	(now	Rwanda	and	Burundi).	Hundreds	of	thousands	of	African	soldiers	fought	in	French	and
British	armies	during	both	world	wars,	serving	and	dying	in	campaigns	from	those	of	the	Western	Front	in	1914–18	to
Burma	in	the	1940s.	As	decolonization	loomed	in	the	1950s,	France	deployed	sub-Saharan	African	troops	in	Indochina
and	in	Algeria	in	vain	attempts	to	suppress	anti-colonial	uprisings.
In	1981,	the	British	imperial	historian	D.	K.	Fieldhouse	argued	that	the	most	important	feature	of	modern	colonialism
between	1870	and	1945	was	‘the	fact	that	colonial	powers	took	full	control	over	the	government	of	the	dependent
societies	within	their	empires’.	While	conceding	that	colonial	rule	may	have	rankled	Africans	at	times,	Fieldhouse
suggested	that	it	was	‘historically	the	lesser	of	two	evils	facing	most	indigenous	peoples	in	the	later	nineteenth	century’,
with	the	other	possible	evil,	he	implied,	having	been	to	leave	Africans	to	themselves. 	With	its	claims	for	prudent
administration,	firm	control,	and	good	intentions,	Fieldhouse’s	description	of	colonial	rule	is	one	that	most	historians	of
Africa	would	argue	against.	Where	Fieldhouse	saw	cool	bureaucracy,	systematic	law	codes,	and	coherent	policies,
historians	have	for	some	years	been	more	likely	to	notice	the	randomness,	incoherence,	and	unpredictable	harshness	of
colonial	‘systems’.	At	the	same	time,	they	are	now	likely	to	question	the	broad	applicability	of	Crawford	Young’s	portrayal
of	the	colonial	state	as	bula	matari,	the	‘breaker	of	rocks’,	a	term	that	Congolese	peoples	used	to	describe	the	brute
force	of	the	Congo	Free	State	and	its	successor	regimes.	While	few	historians	would	query	the	brutality	and	venality	of
the	Congo	Free	State,	they	are	inclined	to	see	the	exertion	of	colonial	power	generally	as	somewhat	more	erratic	and
uneven.
Indeed,	writing	in	1988	about	Francophone	Africa,	Patrick	Manning	emphasized	the	arbitrary	exercise	of	power	as	a
distinguishing	feature	of	African	colonial	states.	Reflecting	on	the	allure	of	colonial	service,	particularly	in	remote	areas
removed	from	firm	central	oversight,	he	noted	that	a
French	man	in	his	twenties,	newly	out	of	school,	might	find	himself	to	be	a	commandant	de	cercle	with	complete
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authority	over	200,000	people.	He	could	accept,	if	he	wished,	the	offers	of	gifts	or	women	from	subjects	who
sought	his	good	will.	Or,	for	those	who	refused	to	pay	taxes,	he	could	burn	their	villages	and	impose	punitive
fines	in	the	near-certain	knowledge	that	the	governor	would	back	him	up.
More	recently,	Gregory	Mann	has	re-examined	the	indigénat,	somewhat	misleadingly	described	in	English	sources	as	the
French	legal	‘code’.	As	Mann	shows,	the	indigénat	was	never	codified;	it	is	better	seen	as	a	grab	bag	of	sanctions	and
punishments,	operating	(p.	162)	 beyond	the	realm	of	courts	and	providing	local	commandants—and	sometimes	in	rural
areas	their	African	gardes-cercle—with	the	option	of	jailing,	fining,	or	lashing	Africans	for	a	host	of	petty	infractions. 	In
Algeria	alone,	there	were	thirty-three	listed	infractions,	which	included	speaking	disrespectfully	to	or	about	a	French
official,	defaming	the	French	Republic,	failing	to	register	a	death,	refusing	to	fight	forest	fires,	and	avoiding	corvée
(forced)	labour.
The	arbitrary	nature	of	colonial	rule	extended	into	places	where,	under	indirect	rule,	African	authorities	heeded
ostensible	tradition.	Illustrating	this	tendency	is	an	incident	that	occurred	1936	in	the	western	Sudan	involving	the	court	of
Ali	al-Tom,	nazir	of	the	Kababish	Arabs	of	Kordofan.	One	of	Ali	al-Tom’s	appointees,	a	relative,	unilaterally	divorced	a
couple	so	that	he	himself	could	wed	the	beautiful	woman.	His	disregard	for	Islamic	social	and	legal	convention	proved
too	egregious	for	local	Muslims	to	tolerate,	although	British	officials	in	Kordofan	were	inclined	to	let	it	stand	(much	to	the
displeasure	of	British	legal	experts	in	Khartoum). 	While	this	episode	illustrates	the	limits	of	inventing	or	revising
tradition,	it	also	demonstrates	the	intricate	distribution	of	authority	as	well	as	the	efforts	of	colonial	states	(involving	in	this
case	both	Sudanese	Muslims	and	Britons)	to	maintain	power	and	shield	it	from	challenges.
Examining	instances	such	as	these,	historians	are	left	to	speculate	about	the	consequences	of	the	strong-arm	and	often
arbitrary	rule	of	colonial	states	for	postcolonial	African	politics.	Colonialism	bequeathed	to	postcolonial	states	an
apparatus	of	government	departments	(ranging	from	Post	and	Telegraphs	to	Education),	military	structures,	and
bureaucratic	methods	and	procedures.	But	did	it	also	bequeath,	through	its	methods	of	administration,	a	governing
culture	of	ruthless	tyranny,	which	included	a	readiness	to	allow	the	unchecked	exercise	of	power?
Locations	of	Power
In	an	article	published	in	1972,	Ronald	Robinson	presented	a	‘sketch	for	a	theory	of	collaboration’. 	British	imperial	rule
was	able	to	function	as	it	did,	he	argued,	because	British	colonial	authorities	found	local	collaborators	who	were	willing
to	work	with	and	help	maintain	colonial	orders	and	amass	power	of	their	own.	Robinson’s	article	became	very	influential
among	historians	of	the	British	Empire.	Yet,	appearing	at	a	time	when	‘the	Africanizing	of	African	history	was	still	the
central	item	on	the	agenda’,	in	Frederick	Cooper’s	words,	and	when	many	historians	of	Africa	avoided	imperial	history	as
‘white	history’,	identifying	some	Africans	as	colonial	lackeys	conveniently	left	room	for	identifying	other	Africans	as
heroes. 	And	African	heroes,	to	historians	of	the	1960s	and	1970s,	were	above	all	anti-colonial	rebels,	whether	of	the
peasant-revolter,	nationalist-agitator,	or	guerrilla-insurrectionist	variety.	To	historians	of	this	generation,	who	were	writing
soon	after	decolonization,	it	was	clear	who	had	power	in	colonial	states:	white	men	in	pith	helmets,	white	men	with	guns,
and	in	rural	areas	that	had	indirect	rule,	some	black	men	such	as	chiefs	and	emirs.
(p.	163)	 Here,	too,	historians’	perspectives	have	changed.	For	a	start,	historians	today	are	disinclined	to	write	history	in
celebratory	modes	and	are	sceptical	about	finding	heroes.	The	picture	now	looks	more	complicated.	Writing	in	2007,
John	Parker	and	Richard	Rathbone	observed:
The	more	we	discover	about	colonial	rule,	the	more	fragmented,	contradictory,	and	malleable	it	appears	to	be,
dependent	on	the	active	participation	of	some	Africans	and	full	of	autonomous	spaces	within	which	others
pursued	their	own	agendas.	No	longer	are	Africans	seen	as	simply	“responding”	to	the	imposition	of	alien	rule
by	either	outright	“resistance”	or	self-interested	“collaboration”.
To	this	one	might	add	the	diffuse	nature	of	colonial	policy-making:	decisions	emanated	from	various	quarters	because
power	rested	in	multiple	and	sometimes	unexpected	places,	and	many	different	voices	chimed	in	when	issues	of	policy
arose.
Even	the	locus	of	power	was	complicated.	A	scholar	writing	in	1976	about	Northern	Rhodesia	observed	that	colonial
administration	‘did	not	merely	represent	the	wishes	of	Britain.	Power	was	filtered	through	Cape	Town’,	as	well	as	through
officials	of	the	British	South	Africa	Company,	who	made	their	opinions	and	priorities	well	known. 	In	a	similar	vein,	one
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could	argue	that	Algiers,	Brazzaville,	and	Dakar,	and	not	only	Paris,	were	imperial	capitals	for	French	Africa,	while	Cairo,
and	not	only	London,	was	a	centre	of	power	relative	to	the	Sudan	and	Nile	basin.	In	2007,	Thomas	Metcalf	made	a
similar	argument	about	India’s	centrality	to	the	British	Empire	vis-à-vis	the	Indian	Ocean	world	from	South	Africa	to
Singapore.	India,	he	argued,	was	a	political	and	cultural	capital,	from	which	emanated,	for	example,	distinctive	styles	of
colonial	architecture. 	The	presence	of	small	but	robust	South	Asian	communities	in	East	Africa	and	South	Africa
strengthened	these	Indian	connections.
Among	Europeans	in	colonial	Africa,	there	were	the	obvious	holders	of	power	and	authority:	administrative	authorities,
military	officers,	business	executives,	big	land-owning	settlers	in	places	like	Kenya	and	Algeria,	and,	to	a	more	varying
extent,	missionaries.	Yet,	as	scholars	delve	into	colonial	history	through	the	study	of	science	and	technology,	health,	the
environment,	and	urban	planning,	a	more	diverse	range	of	agents	are	beginning	to	receive	greater	attention.	Consider,
for	example,	forestry	experts.	In	the	early	twentieth	century,	many	of	these	scientist-technicians	produced	environmental
crisis	narratives	about	African	deforestation	and	mismanagement,	using	these	to	justify	interventions	that	benefited
European	settlers	or	firms.	In	Benin	District	of	southern	Nigeria,	British	forestry	regulations	radically	transformed	farming
practices	along	with	notions	of	land	ownership.	In	1916,	a	new	forestry	ordinance	‘prohibited	the	felling	of	a	long	list	of
tree	species	except	on	payment	of	permit	fees	in	Benin	City’	and	specified	fines	and	imprisonment	for	infractions.	A
series	of	cumulative	measures	of	this	sort	‘virtually	criminalized	farming	and	caused	much	hardship	for	the	populace,
which	led	to	widespread	protests	and	agitation	against	the	ordinance	and	its	strict	implementation’. 	In	Algeria,
meanwhile,	scientists	in	the	forestry	service	implemented	land	seizure	policies	in	the	name	of	protecting	forests	from
Muslim	Algerians,	thereby	aiding	white	wine-makers	and	other	settlers	as	they	expanded	their	hold	on	(p.	164)	 choice
farmlands.	Officials	fined	and	imprisoned	so	many	Algerians	for	infractions	of	forestry	regulations	that	‘some	in	the	military
sought	to	protect	the	Algerians	from	the	Forest	Service	and	its	zealous	agents’. 	Whether	in	Algeria,	Nigeria,	or
elsewhere,	colonial	authorities	seemed	particularly	bent	on	eliminating	the	farming	practice	of	burning	undergrowth
before	planting.	In	one	region	of	Northern	Rhodesia,	local	people	even	dated	a	particular	famine	to	one	District
Commissioner’s	ban	on	the	slash-and-burn	technique. 	Across	much	of	eastern	and	southern	Africa,	veterinarians
mounted	similar	interventions	into	established	practices	of	cattle-keeping,	which	had	a	profound	impact	on	many	pastoral
communities.
Amid	such	exertions	of	power,	Africans	struggled	to	carve	out	their	own	niches	of	influence.	A	search	of	French	colonial
archives	by	Emily	Osborn	unearthed	cases	in	Guinea	and	Soudan	(now	Mali)	from	around	1900	that	demonstrated	‘the
capacity	of	African	colonial	employees	to	influence	the	knowledge,	interpretations,	and	actions	of	their	French
superiors’.	One	example	involved	a	man	named	Ousmane	Fall	who	was	officially	a	district	interpreter—but	in	fact	a	mini-
state-builder—who	‘had	designed	and	supervised	an	elaborate	colonial	“justice”	system	that	employed	four	other	Africans
who	traveled	through	the	district,	hearing	cases,	and	passing	down	judgments’. 	Ousmane	Fall	had	also	forged
certificates	claiming	colonial	authority	and	taken	women	as	captives,	his	elaborate	scheme	only	unravelling	when
stumbled	upon	by	French	authorities.	His	case	provides	a	graphic	illustration	of	colonial	dependence	on	African
intermediaries	and	how	such	dependence	could	lead	to	unexpected	mutations	in	government.
In	a	series	of	books	and	articles,	A.	H.	M.	Kirk-Greene,	a	former	British	colonial	official	in	northern	Nigeria	who	later
became	an	imperial	historian,	examined	the	extreme	sparseness	of	the	British	presence	in	African	colonies.	Officials
were	so	few	on	the	ground	that	they	constituted	what	he	dubbed	a	‘thin	white	line’,	albeit	a	‘line	tipped	with	steel’.	In
some	ways,	Kirk-Greene	concluded,	British	rule	in	Africa	amounted	to	‘a	great-confidence	trick,	a	huge	game	of	white
man’s	bluff’. 	Yet	the	British,	like	the	French	and	other	European	colonizers,	did	more	than	bluff.	They	had	superior
technologies	to	back	them	up	or	enable	surveillance:	aeroplanes,	guns,	radios,	and	so	on.	More	importantly,	they	had
large	cadres	of	local	men	whom	they	drew	into	their	armies	and	bureaucracies.	Colonial	states,	once	again,	rested	upon
complex	structures	of	power.
‘Late	Colonialsim’	and	the	State	in	an	Era	of	Rapid	Change
Historians	sometimes	describe	the	period	from	the	1930s	to	1960s	as	Africa’s	era	of	‘late	colonialism’.	This	term	implies
something	about	timing	(suggesting	the	era	before	independence),	but	also	connotes	a	shifting	mood	and	purpose	in
colonial	regimes.	During	these	years,	regimes	faced	a	spectrum	of	new	challenges.	Some	were	occasioned	by	the	twin
global	crises	of	the	Great	Depression	and	the	Second	World	War;	(p.	165)	 others	by	accelerating	population	growth,
urbanization,	and	social	change	across	the	continent.	The	dramatic	growth	of	cities	was	often	accompanied	by	rising
urban	unrest,	as	workers	and	trade	union	activists	began	to	agitate	for	improved	wages	and	working	conditions.	All	of	this
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resulted	in	what	has	been	described	as	a	‘crisis	of	confidence’	or	‘loss	of	faith’	in	the	colonial	enterprise.	Accompanying
the	loss	of	confidence	was	a	sharper	interest	in	the	idea	of	development,	as	states	sought	to	promote	economic	growth,
expand	social	welfare,	and	placate	rising	African	expectations.	At	the	time,	the	‘fundamental	assumption’	of	colonial
states	may	have	been	‘that	there	was	still	plenty	of	time’;	nevertheless,	in	retrospect,	many	of	these	projects	look	rushed
and	haphazard.
A	classic	example	of	a	late	colonial	development	project	that	brought	rapid	change,	but	which	decolonization	left
hanging,	was	the	‘Zande	Scheme’.	British	officials	introduced	this	scheme	in	1946	in	the	remote	south-western	corner	of
the	Sudan	where	sleeping	sickness	was	endemic.	Project	leaders	uprooted	60,000	scattered	Zande-speaking	people
and	resettled	them	in	‘elongated	village	units	of	50	families’	in	an	‘agglomeration	[that]	also	facilitate[d]​	educational
arrangements,	public	health,	and	medical	programs’.	The	scheme	hired	Arabic-speaking,	northern	Sudanese	Muslims	to
supervise	the	Zande	in	planting	Nigerian	palm	oil	trees	and	cotton,	and	in	extracting	oil	and	fibre	from	them.	But	already,
on	the	eve	of	decolonization	in	1955	(when	civil	war	was	poised	to	erupt),	project	leaders	were	acknowledging	problems
with	soil	erosion,	while	they	speculated	that	the	scheme	needed	many	more	years	‘to	bring	the	peasantry	to	a	civilized
and	prosperous,	if	not	wealthy,	state’.
Colonial	bureaucracies	were	also	changing.	Eager	to	keep	colonial	rule	cheap,	policy-makers	from	the	start	had	been
training	and	hiring	African	men	as	petty	government	employees,	who	typed	and	filed	papers,	surveyed	plots	of	land,
taught	in	government	schools,	disbursed	medicines,	counted	revenues,	and	more.	In	the	1930s,	as	financial	pressure
mounted	as	a	result	of	economic	downturn	and	shrinking	revenues,	local	African	professionals	became	increasingly
important	to	colonial	states,	while	their	accretion	of	responsibility	made	them	more	ambitious. 	By	the	1950s,	as	the
political	ambitions	of	urban	elites	were	joined	by	mounting	popular	agitation,	Britain	and	France	sought	to	placate	rising
demands	by	granting	constitutional	concessions;	the	former	by	expanding	or	creating	local	legislatures	and	the	latter	by
extending	African	representation	in	the	metropolitan	parliament.	Between	1945	and	1958,	France	gradually	extended	the
electoral	franchise,	resulting	in	a	‘dizzying	series’	of	votes	in	‘four	referenda,	two	constitutions,	three	National
Assemblies,	and	three	territorial	assemblies’.
As	the	frontier	of	research	moves	ever	forwards	into	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	historians	of	Africa	are	now
devoting	increasing	attention	to	the	postwar	era	of	late	colonialism	and	decolonization.	At	the	heart	of	their	concerns	lies
the	issue	of	the	nature	of	the	late	colonial	state	and	its	relationship	to	independent	polities	that	followed.	The	question	is
ultimately	about	‘what	difference	the	end	of	empire	meant,	as	well	as	what	kinds	of	processes	continued	even	as
governments	changed	hands’. 	That	is,	to	what	extent	did	independence	and	national	liberation	simply	disguise	a	process
of	continuity	from	autocratic	colony	to	autocratic	‘postcolony’? 	Debates	about	the	legacy	of	late	colonialism	also	turn
on	the	consequences	of	the	move	towards	the	‘developmental	(p.	166)	 state’.	How	substantive,	lasting,	and	socially
ameliorative	were	such	projects	in	practice?	This	much,	at	least,	is	clear:	colonial	states	(along	with	many	Christian
missions)	passed	the	baton	of	development	and	social	welfare	to	multinational	and	international	philanthropic	agencies,	in
a	process	that	anticipated	the	roles	that	non-governmental	organizations	would	play	in	late	twentieth-	and	early	twenty-
first-century	Africa.
Conclusion:	On	the	Agenda
As	historians	of	Africa	continue	to	scrutinize	the	era	of	colonial	rule,	they	are	paying	closer	attention	than	in	the	past	to
the	complex	and	uneven	distribution	of	power	within	states,	seeking	to	understand	the	ways	in	which	diverse	peoples—
administrative	authorities	and	other	European	agents,	but	in	particular	African	historical	actors	themselves—shaped	these
states	and	made	them	function.	They	are	also	seeking	to	broaden	their	range	of	historical	sources	and	approaches	to
them.	This	point	bears	elaboration.	A	generation	ago,	historians	of	colonial	states	were	likely	to	rely	on	official	reports
sent	to	imperial	or	colonial	headquarters	(and	now	stored	in	national	archives),	as	well	as	on	correspondence	and
memoirs	from	European	administrators.	These	sources	tended	to	reflect	the	biases	of	ruling	elites	and	to	convey	an
impression	of	mastery	derived	from	the	gathering	of	knowledge	and	‘intelligence’.	Historians	still	read	these	texts,	of
course,	but	are	more	likely	now	to	read	them	critically,	‘against	the	grain’,	while	listening	for	the	voices	of	less	powerful
people.	Now,	too,	historians	are	likely	to	draw	upon	more	diverse	types	of	sources:	oral	accounts;	visual	materials	such
as	photographs;	and	the	rich	literary	and	artistic	production	of	Africans,	such	as	poems	and	songs.	Interdisciplinary
approaches	to	history	through	the	lenses	of	anthropology,	art	history,	environmental	studies,	and	other	fields	are	also
opening	up	new	windows.
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As	a	result	of	the	widening	frame	of	sources	and	methods,	the	field	of	‘imperial	history’	(with	its	established	focus	on	the
interests,	policies,	and	behaviour	of	European	empire-states	and	their	ruling	elites)	and	that	of	‘African	history’	(with	its
focus	on	the	social	history	of	African	peoples,	including	the	humblest),	have	been	moving	closer	to	each	other.	Growing
scholarly	attention	to	transnational	history	and	the	history	of	diasporas	(including	the	contemporary	history	of	African
migrants	living	in	the	former	colonizing	countries	of	Europe)	has	confirmed	this	trend.	Nevertheless,	to	a	large	extent,
narratives	of	colonial	states	have	continued	to	focus	almost	exclusively	on	the	actions	of	men.	One	challenge	still	facing
historians	is	to	seek	out	and	explore	the	history	of	colonial	states	as	they	involved	women,	as	well	as	the	children	who
were	Africa’s	future.
This	study	of	African	colonial	states	has	focused	on	the	discrepancies	between	the	theory	and	practice	of	administration,
along	with	the	work	of	collecting	taxes,	recruiting	labour,	and	maintaining	control.	It	has	commented	only	briefly	on	the
role	of	colonial	states	in	fostering	development	and	welfare,	for	example,	through	vaccination	campaigns	or	public	health
measures	that	saved	lives,	or	through	establishing	schools	that	opened	doors	to	literacy,	learning,	and	opportunity	for
African	youths.	Such	(p.	167)	 welfare-related	measures	were	important,	but	how	many	people	actually	benefited?	Only
a	tiny	proportion	of	school-age	Africans	in	the	colonial	era,	for	example,	ever	got	the	chance	to	go	to	school.	Bigger
questions	loom,	too.	How	can	historians	assess	the	evidence	for	the	humanitarian	and	altruistic	deeds	of	colonial	states	in
light	of	the	evidence	for	their	brutality	and	rampant,	if	erratic,	aggression?	Returning	to	the	debate	with	which	this
chapter	opened,	how	can	historians	reconcile	the	‘ruthless	exploitation’	that	one	eminent	historian	detected	in	colonial
states	with	the	claims	for	‘moral	obligation’	and	service	that	were	cited	by	two	of	his	colleagues?	This	debate	about	the
intentions	and	deeds	of	colonial	states	shows	no	signs	of	abating,	so	new	generations	of	scholars	will	need	to	continue	to
address	it.
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